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Abstract We classify the empirical literature on the wage impact of immigration into three groups,
where studies in the first two estimate different relative effects, and the third the total effect of
immigration on wages. We interpret the estimates obtained from the different approaches through
the lens of the canonical model to demonstrate that they are not comparable. We then relax two
key assumptions in this literature, allowing for inelastic and heterogeneous labor supply elasticities
of natives and the downgrading of immigrants. We show that heterogeneous labor supply
elasticities, if ignored, may complicate the interpretation of wage estimates, in particular of relative
wage effects. Moreover, downgrading may lead to biased estimates in those approaches that
estimate relative effects of immigration, but not in approaches that estimate total effects. We
conclude that empirical models that estimate total effects not only answer important policy
questions, but are also more robust to alternative assumptions than models that estimate relative
effects.
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2The canonical model for studying the impact of immigration is a partial equilibrium model
that combines one or various types of labor with capital in a constant-returns-to-scale production
function (for an early example, see Altonji and Card 1991). The implications of this model for how
immigration affects wages and employment are straightforward and intuitive. An expansion of a
certain type of labor will lead to a decrease in the wage of native labor of the same type, in absolute
terms and relative to other types of labor—as well as an increase in the marginal productivity of
capital. This model has led to the common view of immigration being potentially harmful for
individuals whose skills are most similar to those of immigrants, but possibly beneficial for those
whose skills are different. However, when this canonical model is implemented through empirical
models, some studies using this approach find a sizeable effect of immigration on wages of native
workers, while others do not. For instance, while Card (2009) finds that immigration to the US has
only a minor effect on native wages, Borjas (2003) provides evidence for wages of natives being
harmed by immigration and Ottaviani and Peri (2012) report positive wage effects on natives. One
reaction to these apparently contradictory findings has been to expand the theoretical framework
in various ways. For example, one approach is to acknowledge the multiple output nature of an
economy, thus adding possibilities of adjustment to immigration along the product mix and
technology margins (e.g., Card and Lewis 2007; Lewis 2011; Dustmann and Glitz 2015). Another
theoretical alternative is to allow the price of the output good to vary, rather than being fixed (e.g.,
Özden and Wagner 2015).
Such alternative theories are worth exploring for their own sake, but we do not believe that
they are necessary for explaining the differing findings from empirical studies of how immigration
affects wages. We argue here that the often contradictory results in the empirical literature have
two important sources. First, despite being derived from the same canonical model, different
3empirical specifications measure different parameters. Second, two assumptions that are
commonly and tacitly made when bringing this framework to the data may be invalid: (i) that the
labor supply elasticity is homogenous across different groups of natives, and (ii) that we can place
immigrants and natives into education-experience cells within which they compete in the labor
market, based on their reported education and age.
In the next section, we classify existing empirical specifications into three groups. One
specification, as in for example Borjas (2003), exploits variation in immigrant inflows across
education-experience cells on a national level (“national skill-cell approach”). Another
specification, as in for example Altonji and Card (1991), uses variation in the total immigrant flow
across regions (“pure spatial approach”), while a third specification, as in for example Card (2001)
uses variation in immigrant inflows both across education groups and across regions (“mixture
approach”). As we illustrate in Table 1, the national skill-cell approach tends to produce more
negative wage effects for natives in response to immigration than the mixture approach, while
estimates obtained from the pure spatial approach vary widely depending on which skill group is
studied. However, as we argue below, estimates obtained from the different models are not
comparable, answer different questions, and have different interpretations. While the national
skill-cell and the mixture approach identify a relative wage effect of immigration—of one
experience group versus another within education groups and of one education group versus
another—the pure spatial approach recovers the total wage effect of immigration on a particular
native skill group that takes into account complementarities across skill-cells and across labor and
capital. We illustrate that the different specifications are motivated by variants of the same
canonical model, but estimate different structural parameters.
4We then turn to two extensions. First, research in this area typically assumes that the
elasticity of labor supply is homogenous across different groups of natives (with many papers
implicitly postulating a vertical labor supply curve). This assumption allows focusing the analysis
on wages and ignoring employment responses. However, if the employment of natives responds
to immigration, part of its overall impact on the labor market will be absorbed by employment as
opposed to wage responses. Moreover, not only is labor supply likely to be elastic, but it is also
likely to differ across groups of native workers (such as skilled and unskilled, or younger and older
workers). We illustrate that with group-specific labor supply elasticities, the national skill-cell
approach may produce estimates that are hard to interpret, while approaches that estimate total
effects still produce estimates that have a clear interpretation. Furthermore, the degree to which
the labor supply response of natives differs across groups, and its overall level, depend on the
variation the chosen approach uses for identification. When using variation across skill-experience
cells on the national level, employment adjusts only at the un- and non-employment margin. In
contrast, when using variation across local labor markets, as in the pure spatial or mixture
approach, the labor supply of natives may respond more elastically, due to the regional migration
of workers.
Second, the national skill-cell and the mixture approach rely on the assumption that an
immigrant and a native with the same measured education and experience compete against each
other. However, there is strong empirical evidence that immigrants “downgrade” upon arrival, and
we demonstrate the downgrading of immigrants for three countries, the US, the UK, and Germany.
Consequently, assigning immigrants to skill groups according to their measured skills may lead to
misclassification, and seriously impair the estimates of wage responses of natives to immigration.
Although the bias cannot be unambiguously signed, we provide evidence suggesting that in the
5US context, downgrading may overstate the negative impact of immigration in both the national
skill-cell and the mixture approach, but particularly so in the national skill-cell approach.
Downgrading may therefore be one reason why the national skill-cell approach tends to produce
more negative native wage effects than the mixture approach. In contrast, approaches that estimate
total effects of immigration are robust to downgrading as they do not require the allocation of
immigrants into skill groups.
In a final step, we turn to approaches that explicitly estimate the underlying parameters of
the canonical model above and then use that model to predict the wage effects of immigration, as
in for example Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012). We
contend that downgrading may seriously impair the estimation of a key parameter in this approach,
the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives, which may help to explain why
studies using this approach find often positive wage effects of immigration for natives.
In summary, we argue that differences in coefficients estimated by the different
specifications, and the assumptions being made about native labor supply responses and
downgrading may explain many of the apparent contradictions among the empirical findings
reported in the literature. We advocate investigating the effects of the overall (as opposed to the
group-specific) immigration shock on wages and employment of various native groups. This
procedure avoids the pre-classification of workers into groups and is therefore immune to the
misclassification of immigrants that arises due to the “downgrading” phenomenon. Further, it
estimates a parameter that is of direct policy relevance and easily interpretable, even if labor supply
elasticities differ across groups of native workers.
6We should emphasize that this paper is about the correct specification of empirical models
and the interpretation of the estimated parameters, not about empirical identification. Any of the
approaches we discuss slices the labor market in different sub-labor markets, and uses variation in
the inflow of immigrants into these sub-labor markets as an identification device. We assume here
that the allocation of immigrants to these sub-labor markets is (conditionally) independent of
shocks to wages or employment of native workers (which could be achieved either through random
allocation of immigrants, or by use of an appropriate instrument), and that some, but not other sub-
labor markets are exposed to an inflow of immigrants.1
Throughout the paper, we explain our arguments informally and verbally. We have
prepared a self-contained companion appendix to this paper which provides more formal
derivations and technical discussions.
Estimation Approaches Used in the Literature
The existing empirical literature has derived three conceptually different effects of
immigration on wages, estimated using different types of variation for identification: estimation at
the national level exploiting variation in the skill-cell specific inflow of immigrants, as pioneered
by Borjas (2003), estimation at the regional level exploiting variation in the total inflow of
immigrants, as pioneered by Altonji and Card (1991), and estimation at the regional level
1 The identification of empirical models is a key problem in the literature. Studies that slice the labor market into
spatial units typically rely on using past settlement of immigrants as an instrumental variable, as used in Altonji and
Card (1991) and further developed in Card (2001). Studies that slice the labor market into skill groups instead typically
assume that immigrant inflows are exogenous, an assumption that may be violated (Llull 2014). A number of studies
exploit natural quasi-experiments that lead to a sharp rise or fall in immigration for identification purposes, such as
Card (1990), Hunt (1992), Carrington and De Lima (1996), Friedberg (2001), Glitz (2012), Dustmann, Schönberg and
Stuhler (2015), and Foged and Peri (2016). Moreover, “push factors” that generate out-migration can be combined
with the past settlement instrument (e.g., Boustan et al. 2010; Ganguli 2014; Aydemir and Kirdar 2014; Monras
2015a).
7exploiting variation in the inflow of immigrants both across areas and skill-cells, as for instance in
Card (2001). These different empirical approaches identify conceptually different parameters that
are not directly comparable—even if the estimation regressions are motivated by the same
canonical model (or versions of it).
The National Skill-Cell Approach: Variation in the Immigration Shock across Skill-
cells
Borjas (2003) estimates the wage effects of immigration at the national level by categorizing
immigrants and natives into education-experience cells using data from various census waves. This
method identifies the relative wage effect of immigration by experience. To see this, we rewrite
his baseline estimation equation (see equation (3) in his paper) as a first difference equation to
obtain:2
Δ ݋݈݃ ݓ௚௔௧ = ߠ௦௞௜௟௟Δ݌௚௔௧+ Δߨ௧+ ൫ݏ௚ × Δߨ௧൯+ (ݔ௔ × Δߨ௧) + Δ߮௚௔௧, (1)
where Δ ݋݈݃ ݓ௚௔௧ denotes the change in native wage (in logs) in education group g, experience
group a at time t and Δ݌௚௔௧ denotes the education-experience specific immigration shock, defined
as the difference in the ratio of immigrants to all labor in each education-experience group ݃ܽ
between two time periods. The variables ݏ௚,ݔ௔, and ߨ௧ are vectors of education, experience and
time fixed effects. In the case of two education and experience groups, the parameter ߠ௦௞௜௟௟ may
be thought of as a triple difference estimator where differences are taken over time, experience
groups, and education groups. The inclusion of time fixed effects in first differences absorbs the
overall immigration shock—any effects of immigration common to all education and experience
2 We have swapped the sub-indices i and j used by Borjas to denote education and experience cells with the
sub-indices g and a used by us in the next section.
8groups are therefore differenced out. The education-time fixed effects capture, in addition to
differential time trends by education unrelated to immigration, differences in immigration shocks
across education groups—any effects of immigration common to all experience groups within
education groups are therefore likewise differenced out. The inclusion of experience-time fixed
effects, in turn, soaks up the experience-specific immigration shock, in addition to allowing for
differential time trends by experience unrelated to immigration. The parameter ߠ௦௞௜௟௟ therefore
identifies the relative effect of immigration by experience and answers the question: “How does
immigration affect native wages of experienced relative to inexperienced workers in the same
education group?” Since the effects of immigration that are common to the education group are
differenced out, this parameter is not informative about the distributional effects between
education groups, nor about its absolute effects. The upper panel of Table 1 provides an overview
of some of the papers adopting the national skill-cell approach. Typical wage estimates for native
men are around -0.5 (e.g., Borjas 2003; Aydemir and Borjas 2007; Borjas 2014). Estimates turn
substantially more negative when instrumenting for the potential endogeneity of the immigration
shock across education-experience cells (Llull 2014). In contrast, using an alternative measure for
the education-experience specific immigration shock, Card and Peri (2016) report a smaller
estimate of -0.1.
The Pure Spatial Approach: Variation in the Total Immigration Shock across Regions
In many studies that exploit spatial variation in immigrant inflows, the log wage changes
of natives in education group g and experience group a in region r are related to the total region-
specific immigration shock (defined as the ratio of all immigrants entering the region and all
natives in that region), controlling for nation-wide education-experience specific time trends
(ݏ௚௔ × Δߨ௧):
9Δ ݋݈݃ ݓ௚௔௥௧= θ௚௔
௦௣௔௧௜௔௟
Δ݌௥௧+ ݏ௚௔ × Δߨ௧+ Δ߮௚௔௥௧. (2)
In the case of two time periods and two regions A and B, the parameter θ௚௔
௦௣௔௧௜௔௟equals a difference-
in-difference estimator where differences are taken over time and across regions. Provided that
region B, otherwise identical to region A, did not experience an inflow of immigrants and is not
indirectly affected by the immigration shock in region A through, e.g., outmigration of natives,
this parameter identifies the total effect of immigration on wages of a particular skill group. It
answers the question: “What is the overall effect of immigration on native wages of a particular
education-experience group?” It is informative about the distributional effects of immigration both
between education and experience groups, as well as about its absolute effects. The second panel
of Table 1 provides an overview of some papers that adopt the pure spatial approach. For example,
Altonji and Card (1991) report total wage estimates for white male high school dropouts of about
-1.1, while Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) find negative total wage effects of about -0.5 at
the 10th percentile, and positive wage effects of 0.4 at the 90th of the earnings distribution. Card
(2007) finds small positive total wage effects (0.06) for natives on average.
The Mixture Approach: Variation in the Immigration Shock across both Skill-Cells and
Regions
A third set of papers exploits variation in the immigration shock across both skill-cells and
regions, and are therefore a mixture of the pure skill-cell approach and the pure spatial approach.
Most papers which fall into this category distinguish only between education (or occupation) cells.
These papers then relate the wage change of natives in education group g and region r to the
education-specific immigration shock in that region (Δ݌௚௥௧), controlling for education- and
region-specific time trends (ݏ௚ × Δߨ௧ and ݏ௥× Δߨ௧):
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Δ ݋݈݃ ݓ௚௥௧ = ߠ௦௣௔௧௜௔௟,௦௞௜௟௟Δ݌௚௥௧+ (ݏ௥× Δߨ௧) + ൫ݏ௚ × Δߨ௧൯+ Δ߮௚௥௧. (3)
In the simple case of two regions A and B, two time periods and two education groups, the
parameterߠ௦௣௔௧௜௔௟,௦௞௜௟௟can be expressed as a triple difference estimator where differences are taken
over time, across regions, and across education groups. By conditioning on region-specific time
effects and thus absorbing the total region-specific immigration shock, ߠ௦௣௔௧௜௔௟,௦௞௜௟௟ identifies the
relative effect of immigration by education and answers the question: “How does immigration
affect native wages of low skilled relative to high skilled workers?” Since the effects of
immigration common to all education-experience groups are differenced out, the mixture approach
is informative about the distributional effects of immigration between education groups, but not
about its absolute effects. The bottom panel of Table 1 provides an overview of some of the papers
that adopt the mixture approach. Estimates are generally less negative than those obtained from
the national skill-cell approach. For example, Card (2001), who uses just one cross-section and
distinguishes between occupations rather than education groups, reports a wage estimate of -0.1
for native men. Dustmann and Glitz (2015) find a more negative response in non-tradable
industries, but little response in tradable or manufacturing industries.
In sum, depending on the definition of the immigration induced labor supply shock (skill group
specific or overall) and the variation in immigration shocks used (across skill-cells, across regions,
or both), the level of the analysis (e.g., education groups vs education-experience groups), and the
control variables used in the estimation regressions, different approaches identify conceptually
different parameters. Although these parameters are not directly comparable, it is possible to
transform total effects into relative effects of immigration by experience and education. In contrast,
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since total effects of immigration contain additional information to relative effects, the latter
cannot be transformed into the former.
Interpretation of Relative and Total Effects of Immigration through the
Lens of the Canonical Model
To aid the interpretation of the parameters estimated by the three main empirical
approaches, we now present a simple version of the canonical model that motivates the empirical
specifications outlined above.
Set-Up
Production Function: We assume a simple Cobb-Douglas production function that
combines capital ܭ and labor ܮ into a single output good ,ܻ Y = ALଵିఈܭఈ . Labor is assumed to
be a CES aggregate of different education types, and we distinguish here between low (ܮ௅) and
high skilled (ܮு ) labor only, so that L = [θ௅L௅ఉ + θுLுఉ ]ଵ/ఉ . The elasticity of substitution between
low and high skilled workers is given by 1/(1 − ߚ), and measures the percentage change in the
ratio of low skilled workers to high skilled workers in response to a given percentage change in
the wages of low skilled to high skilled workers. The higher this elasticity, the more substitutable
the two groups are. The two skill types are perfect substitutes (implying an infinite substitution
elasticity) if ߚ = 1.
Within each education group, we allow, similar to Card and Lemieux (2001), inexperienced
(ܮூ) and experienced (ܮா) workers to be imperfect substitutes, so that ܮ௚ = [θ௚ூL௚ூఊ + θ௚ாL௚ாఊ ]ଵ/ఊ,
and where 1/(1 − ߛ) is the elasticity of substitution between inexperienced and experienced
workers within an education group. If ߛ= 1, the two groups are perfect substitutes. We assume
here that immigrants can be correctly classified to education and experience groups and that within
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an education-experience group, immigrants and natives are perfect substitutes. We turn to the
possibility of misclassification and imperfect substitutability between immigrants and natives
below.
Firms choose capital and labor by maximizing profits, taking wage rates and the price of
capital as given. Output prices are assumed to be determined in the world market and are
normalized to 1.
Capital and Labor Supply: Capital is supplied to the labor market according to ݎ= ܭఒ,
where ݎdenotes the price of capital and 1/ߣ is the elasticity of capital supply. We assume that the
labor supply of immigrants who enter the country is inelastic. In contrast, native employment in
an education-experience group depends on the wage in that education-experience group. Let ߟ௚௔
denote the labor supply elasticity for a particular education-experience group. It measures the
percentage change in the supply of native labor in the education-experience group in response to
a given percentage change in the wage of that group. The degree to which native labor supply
responds to an immigration induced labor supply shock (and the heterogeneity across groups)
depends on the alternatives an individual has when wages in the current (or desired) job decline.
If wages decline in the local economy, workers may respond by moving away (or no longer moving
into the area). However, if wages decrease in all firms in the national economy, workers can
respond only by moving from and into unemployment or by entering or exiting the labor force.
Thus, when using spatial variation in immigrant inflows (as in the pure spatial and the mixture
approach), estimated labor supply elasticities of natives are likely larger than when using variation
across skill-cells in the national labor market (as in the national skill-cell approach).
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Labor supply elasticities on the national level may differ between different groups of
workers. For instance, Altonji and Blank (1999) find that married women have the largest labor
supply elasticities on the national level, while Ljungqvist and Sargent (2007) and Rogerson and
Wallenius (2009) emphasize that individuals near retirement or those with low wage rates exhibit
particularly large extensive margin responses. Groups that have the weakest attachment to the
labor force, such as single mothers, appear more elastic on the extensive margin (see, e.g., Meyer
and Rosenbaum 2001, Gruber and Wise 1999, Heckman 1993, Keane and Rogerson 2015, and
Chetty et al. 2012 for a summary).
The labor supply elasticity at the local level captures in addition the internal migration of
workers between areas and may thus depend on additional factors such as the supply of housing
(Moretti 2011) and the size of the labor market that is considered (see, e.g., Borjas 2006). This
adjustment margin may have different importance for different types of workers. For example,
geographic mobility may be a more important adjustment margin for skilled workers, as migration
rates rise with education (Greenwood 1975; Molloy, Smith and Wozniak 2011). Indeed, Bound
and Holzer (2000) find that skilled workers are more likely to move in response to a local shock,
as do Wozniak (2010), Notowidigdo (2011), Amior and Manning (2015), and Dustmann,
Schönberg and Stuhler (2015). Similarly, Cadena and Kovak (2016) note that location choices
respond more strongly to demand shocks for Mexican-born immigrants than for natives. Such
patterns affect the incidence of local shocks. For example, Hornbeck and Moretti (2015) find that
because college graduates move in greater numbers in response to a local productivity shock, its
incidence is reduced for skilled workers. Both the overall size of the elasticity and the relative
importance of the underlying adjustment margins may vary across groups. For example,
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Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler (2015) find that young workers respond more strongly at the
geographic margin than older workers.
Interpretation of Relative and Total Wage Effects of Immigration if Labor Supply is
Inelastic
A common assumption in the literature is that native employment does not respond to wage
changes (e.g., Borjas 2003; Ottaviano and Peri 2012). With inelastic native labor supply, the only
reason why total, education- and education-experience specific employment change is because of
immigration. In this case, the equilibrium native wage response due to immigration equals:
∆ ݋݈݃ ݓ௚௔ = −
ఈ஛
ଵିఈା஛
∆ܫሚ+ (ߚ− 1)൫∆ܫሚ௚ − ∆ܫሚ൯+ (γ − 1)(∆ܫ௚௔ − ∆ܫሚ௚), (4)
where ∆Iሚ and ∆ܫሚ௚ are the overall and education-specific immigration shocks, measured as
percentage change in efficiency units, and ∆ܫ௚௔ is the education-experience specific immigration
shock. Consider first the third term in equation (4), and suppose that within each education group
immigration is relatively inexperienced. This term is then negative for inexperienced natives, and
positive for experienced natives. Thus, ceteris paribus, immigration will lower wages of
inexperienced natives and raise wages of experienced natives within each education group.
The second term in this equation looks at how changes in immigration disproportionately affect
education levels. The second term will be negative for the education group that is exposed to the
larger inflow of immigrants and positive for the other education group, implying wage declines
for the former and wage increases for the latter group (holding the other terms constant). Thus, the
second and third terms summarize the key insight of the simple competitive model: Immigration
will decrease the marginal product and hence wages of native workers most similar to immigrant
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workers, and may increase the marginal product and wages of native workers most dissimilar to
immigrant workers.
Finally, the first term in equation (4) captures the wage effects of immigration common to
all education and experience groups and can, at an intuitive level, be understood at the slope of the
aggregate demand curve. If capital supply is fully elastic (ߣ= 0), this term disappears and on
average, wages do not change in response to immigration. If in contrast capital supply is not fully
elastic, the direct overall immigration shock pulls down wages of all skill groups in the same way,
and an immigration-induced labor supply shock has a negative effect on average wages—as
immigration will lead to increases in the rent of capital and re-distribute a share of output from
labor to capital. The literature often denotes the case of inelastic capital supply as the short-run
effect of immigration, and the case of perfectly elastic labor supply as the long-run effect.
Based on equation (4), it is now straightforward to provide a structural interpretation of the relative
and total effects of immigration identified by the three empirical approaches described in the
previous section.
National Skill-Cell Approach: As explained above, the national skill-cell approach pioneered by
Borjas (2003) identifies the relative wage effect of immigration by experience, and any effects of
immigration common to all education and experience groups as well as any effects of immigration
common to all experience groups within education groups are differenced out. Put differently, in
the empirical specification underlying the national skill-cell approach the total and the education-
specific immigration shocks are held constant through the inclusion of general and education-
specific time fixed effects. The parameter ߠ௦௞௜௟௟ estimated by the spatial skill-cell approach may
therefore be thought of as the direct partial effect of immigration, holding the total and the
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education-specific immigration shock constant. From equation (4), ߠ௦௞௜௟௟ identifies (γ − 1), the
inverse of the elasticity of substitution between experienced and inexperienced workers within
education groups. It is unambiguously negative (as γ < 1), the more so the less substitutable
experienced and inexperienced workers are within education groups.
Mixture Approach: Studies that exploit variation in the immigration shock across both skill-cells
and regions (e.g., LaLonde and Topel 1991; Card 2009) identify the relative wage effect of
immigration by education, as any effects of immigration common to all education groups are
differenced out. The parameter ߠ௦௣௔௧௜௔௟,௦௞௜௟௟ estimated by the mixture approach may thus be
thought of as the direct partial effect of immigration holding the total immigration shock constant.
From equation (4), ߠ௦௣௔௧௜௔௟,௦௞௜௟௟ identifies (ߚ− 1), the inverse of the elasticity of substitution
between unskilled and skilled workers. This parameter is unambiguously negative, the more so the
less substitutable low and high skilled workers are.
Pure Spatial Approach: The pure spatial approach adopted by for example Altonji and Card (1991)
identifies the total wage effect of immigration for workers in education and experience group ga.
From equation (4), the parameter ߠ௚௔
௦௣௔௧௜௔௟ corresponds to
∆௟௢௚௪೒ೌ
∆ூ
, where ∆ܫ denotes the total
immigration shock in head counts, measured in the same way as in the empirical equation (2). In
addition to the elasticities of substitution between inexperienced and experienced workers and low
and high skilled workers, it depends on the elasticity of capital supply and the share of capital in
production. This total effect measures not only the direct partial effects of an immigration induced
labor supply shock on native workers in a particular education-experience or education group, but
also the indirect effects through complementarities across skill-cells and across capital and labor
and is, for this reason, in our view the most policy-relevant parameter. If capital supply is fully
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elastic, the total wage effect of immigration will be zero on average, while negative for some skill
groups—those experiencing the stronger inflow of immigrants—and positive for other skill
groups. If capital supply is fully inelastic, the total wage effect may be negative for all skill groups.
Interpretation if Labor Supply is Elastic, but Constant Across Skill Groups
So far, we have discussed the interpretation of the relative and total wage effects of
immigration under the assumption that native labor does not respond to wage changes. Next, we
turn to the case in which native labor supply does adjust to wage changes, but the labor supply
elasticity is constant across skill groups. In this case, the labor market effects of immigration are
not only absorbed through wage changes, but also through employment changes. Therefore, to
obtain a complete picture of both the relative and total effects of immigration, wage and
employment responses need to be studied jointly. As the labor supply elasticity increases, both the
relative and the total wage effects become more muted, whereas the respective employment effects
increase. If labor supply is infinitely elastic, the relative and total wage effects of immigration
approach zero, whereas the respective employment effects approach -1, implying that each
immigrant displaces one native worker. As discussed, the labor supply elasticity is likely to be
larger at the national level than at the local level—which, as emphasized by Borjas (2003), may
help to explain why the national skill-cell approach tends to produce more negative wage effects
than the mixture approach.
Our discussion so far has assumed that wages are fully downward flexible. In practice, wages may
however be partially downward rigid at least in the short-run, for example because of institutional
constraints or contractual agreements. The degree of downward wage rigidity plays a similar role
in determining the wage and employment impacts of immigration as the labor supply elasticity;
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the higher the degree of rigidity, the smaller the wage and the larger the employment response to
immigration. Wage rigidity therefore provides an additional reason why native wage and
employment responses need to be studied jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the labor market
impacts of immigration.
Under the assumption that wages are fully downward flexible, estimates of the labor supply
elasticities can be obtained by dividing the total or relative native wage response by the respective
native employment response. It is important to emphasize that the ratio of wage and employment
effects obtained from the pure spatial or the mixture approach identifies the local labor supply
elasticity, while estimates obtained from the skill-cell approach identifies a national supply
elasticity. Ebert and Stone (1992) estimates the local labor supply elasticity to be about 5 on the
metropolitan statistical area level in the US, while Bartik (1991), Lettau (1994), Smith (2012) and
Notowidigdo (2012) somewhat smaller estimates in the range of 1.5 to 4. Because of differences
in specifications, such as the time frame and size of the local area considered, these estimates are
not fully comparable. Estimates for the national labor supply elasticity at the extensive margin,
typically estimated using tax changes, tend to be smaller: the meta-analysis in Chetty et al. (2012)
points to an extensive margin elasticity of around 0.25. Longitudinal data, which trace workers
over time across regions, make it possible to decompose the local employment response into
inflows from and outflows to non-employment, and inflows from and outflows to employment in
other regions. For instance, Dustmann, Schönberg and Stuhler (2015) show that in their context,
movements across regions account for roughly one third of the overall local native employment
response, which adjusts predominantly because inflows into employment in the affected region
decline (see also Filer 1992 and Monras 2015b for similar evidence).
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Interpretation if Labor Supply Elasticities Vary across Skill Groups
So far, we have assumed that the elasticity of labor supply is constant across education-
experience groups. It is likely, however, that labor supply elasticities differ between different
groups of workers, both on national and local level (see our discussion above). Alternatively, the
degree of wage rigidity may differ across groups of workers. For example, Dustmann, Schönberg
and Stuhler (2015), argue that older workers’ wages may be more “protected” than those of
younger workers and, unlike wages of younger workers, less likely to adjust downward. Next, we
highlight the implications of heterogeneity in labor supply elasticities or in the degree of wage
rigidities across groups of workers for the interpretation of the relative and total effects of
immigration.
Mixture Approach: Consider first the relative effect of immigration by education identified by the
mixture approach. A key implication of the canonical model is that natives who suffer the largest
inflow of immigrations (e.g., low-skilled workers if immigration is relatively low-skilled) suffer
the largest decline in wages as well as employment. With heterogeneous labor supply elasticities,
however, this may no longer hold—a phenomenon we refer to as “perverse” effects (see also
Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler 2015). To grasp the intuition for the possibility of perverse
effects, suppose that immigration is relatively low skilled and that, in line with the empirical
evidence that low skilled workers respond more elastically to wage changes along the un- or non-
employment margin, low skilled natives have a higher labor supply elasticity than high skilled
natives. In equilibrium, low skilled natives’ employment will then have responded strongly relative
to high skilled natives’ employment, while their wages adjust less, and may even increase relative
to those of high skilled natives. In the presence of heterogeneous labor supply elasticities, the
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relative wage and employment effect of immigration may therefore be of opposite sign. While the
mixture approach continues to be informative about how immigration affects wages and
employment of one education group relative to the other, focusing solely on native wage responses
may yield a misleading picture of the overall relative effects of immigration. The possibility of
perverse effects therefore reinforces our conclusion that wage and employment responses need to
be studied jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the labor market impacts of immigration.
National Skill-Cell Approach: Consider next the wage and employment effects estimated by the
national skill-cell approach (ߠ௦௞௜௟௟), which compares wage changes between inexperienced and
experienced low skilled workers with those of inexperienced and experienced high skilled workers.
When labor supply elasticities (or the degrees of wage rigidity) vary across groups, estimates
obtained from this approach are difficult to interpret and may no longer be informative about the
effects of immigration on experienced natives relative to inexperienced natives within education
groups. This is because the relative wage effect of one experience group versus the other among
low skilled workers is likely to differ from that among high skilled workers. It can be shown that
the triple difference estimator of ߠ௦௞௜௟௟implied by equation (1) aggregates the two relative wage
effects by experience in a non-meaningful way, as it assigns a negative weight to the relative effect
in one education group and a weight greater than 1 to the relative effect in the other education
group.
Pure Spatial Approach: In contrast, the total effect of immigration estimated by the pure
spatial approach remains a meaningful and policy-relevant parameter even in the presence of
heterogeneous labor supply elasticities, addressing the same question as in the case of homogenous
(or inelastic) labor supply responses: “How does the overall immigration shock affect wages and
21
employment of a particular native education-experience group?” Estimates for the education-
experience specific labor supply elasticities can then be obtained by dividing the estimates for the
total native employment effect in a particular education-experience group by the respective
estimate of the total wage effect.
Downgrading and Misclassification
Empirical Evidence of Downgrading
“Downgrading” occurs when the position of immigrants in the labor market, which is
typically measured by wage or occupation, is systematically lower than the position of natives with
the same observed education and experience levels. Downgrading means that immigrants receive
lower returns to the same measured skills than natives when these skills are acquired in their
country of origin.
The research literature provides ample evidence on the initial downgrading of immigrant
arrivals and their subsequent economic assimilation. As one example, for the case of immigration
from Russia to Israel in the 1990s, the returns immigrants receive for their schooling and
experience are initially zero or even negative, but rise with time spent in the host country, while
immigrants with high education climb up the occupational ladder to move into high-skill
occupations (Eckstein and Weiss 2004). Estimates of earnings equations such as those by Chiswick
(1978), Borjas (1985) or Dustmann (1993), among others, have long shown that immigrants’
earnings profiles are comparatively flat with respect to labor market experience or schooling
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acquired at home. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) present evidence on immigrant
downgrading for the UK, and Dustmann and Preston (2012) for the UK and the US economies.3
In the presence of downgrading, placement of immigrants into education or education-
experience cells within which they compete with natives—a pre-requisite of the skill-cell approach
and the mixture approach—becomes difficult. For instance, a Polish surgeon who arrives in the
UK may lack formal requirements or complementary skills such as the English language and might
end up working as a nurse, at least initially. However, based on observed education, the researcher
would allocate this surgeon to a skill-cell further up the skill distribution.
To illustrate the degree of downgrading of immigrants, we offer some evidence from the
US, the UK, and Germany. We use data from the 2000 US Census, the German IAB Employment
subsample, and from the UK labor force survey for the period between 1995 and 2005. In Figure
1, we show where recent immigrants (whom we define as immigrants who arrived over the past
two years) are actually situated in the native wage distribution (the dashed lines in Panels A-C),
and where we would assign them if they received the same return to their experience and education
as natives (the solid lines in Panels A-C). The figures first illustrate that in all three countries,
immigrants are, relative to natives with the same formal measurements of experience and
education, overrepresented at the bottom of the wage distribution, and underrepresented in the
middle or upper ends of the wage distribution. The dashed line (showing where immigrants are
actually located) lies for all three countries above the solid line (showing where immigrants should
be located based on their education and experience) at low percentiles of the wage distribution,
3 Indirect evidence on initial downgrading follows also from the occupational upgrading of immigrants upon
legalization (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2000) and the relation between changes in immigration status and native
wages (Orrenius and Zavodny 2007). The issue of downgrading has also been acknowledged in various papers that
use the skill-cell approach, such as Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997, p. 42) and Borjas (2003).
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but tends to be underneath the solid line further up the wage distribution.4 Overall, for the three
countries of Germany, the US and the UK, recent immigrants have on average wages that are 17.9
percent, 15.5 percent and, 12.9 percent below those native workers would receive after controlling
for sex, age, education groups, and age-by-education interactions. The degree of downgrading may
change over time and differ across groups. In the UK, our own calculations (not shown here) show
that cohorts that arrived in the mid- or late 1990s downgrade less strongly than for those that
entered in the mid-2000s. In Germany, immigrants arriving in 2000 from other EU countries do
not downgrade on average, while the degree of downgrading is substantial for arrivals from other
source countries.
Downgrading is most severe in the years after immigrants arrive, as immigrants upgrade
their skills and acquire complementary skills in the host county. But the first years after arrival are
exactly the years that matter when estimating the labor market impacts of immigration. For
instance, when annual data is used, the change in the share of immigrants is driven by those who
arrived over the past year. We illustrate “upgrading” in Figure 1d, where we plot the difference
between the actual position of immigrants in the native wage distribution and their predicted
position based on observable characteristics (the dashed lines), for immigrants with different
durations in the US. If immigrants and natives with similar characteristics have similar wages, then
4 More specifically, the allocation of where immigrants should be located according to their observable human capital
characteristics (and where the skill-cell approach as well as the structural approach we discuss below would allocate
them) is based on a flexible log wage regression model estimated for natives. It includes five age categories (18/25,
26/35, 36/45, 46/55, 56/65), four educational categories (three for Germany), and interactions between the two. We
fit separate models for men and women and for different years, compute fitted values for immigrants, and add a
normally distributed error term (based on the category-specific residual variance for natives) to compute their
predicted rank within the native wage distribution. As the income rank is bounded, conventional kernel estimation
with fixed window width would give misleading estimates at the extremes. The kernel estimates are therefore
calculated on the log of the odds of the position in the non-immigrant distribution, as in Dustmann, Frattini and Preston
(2013).
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the actual and predicted positons should coincide (solid line). The panel shows that these profiles
become indeed more similar the longer immigrants are in the country.
In the companion appendix to this paper, we propose a simple procedure to impute the
degree of immigrant downgrading upon arrival in each education-experience cell under the
assumption that immigrants and natives of the same effective education-experience type are
equally likely to work in a particular occupation-wage group. We apply this procedure to
immigrant cohorts that entered the US, UK and Germany around the year 2000. Table 2 contrasts
their observed education-experience distribution with their effective one. In all three countries,
there is considerable downgrading by experience: in each of them, the share of immigrants who
are observed to be experienced is at least twice as high as the share of immigrants who are
effectively experienced. Downgrading by education is particularly striking in the UK: Whereas
69.7% of immigrant arrivals to the UK would be classified as high skilled based on their reported
education, only 24.6% are effectively high skilled, suggesting that far from a supply shock for high
skilled workers, immigrant arrivals to the UK were a supply shock in the market for low skilled
workers.
Interpretation of Relative and Total Effects of Immigration when Immigrants Downgrade
Downgrading may seriously bias the assessment of the wage and employment effects of
immigration in the national skill-cell and in the mixture approach that rely on the pre-assignment
of immigrants to education and experience cells and then exploit variation in the relative density
of immigrants across those skill groups. In contrast, the total effects of immigration obtained from
the pure spatial approach is robust to the downgrading of immigrants and remains a policy relevant
parameter, addressing the question of how the overall immigration shock affects wages and
employment of a particular skill group. Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2013) emphasize that with
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this approach, the actual position of immigrants in the distribution of native skills is part of the
estimated parameter.
Mixture Approach: Downgrading leads to an overestimate of the true immigration shock to high
skilled natives, and an underestimate of the true immigration shock to low skilled natives. In the
mixture approach, the direction of the bias due to downgrading is principally ambiguous, and
depends on whether the observed immigration shock is relatively low-skilled or relatively high-
skilled. If, as it is the case in the US context, observed immigration is relatively low-skilled, then
downgrading will lead to an overstatement of the negative relative wage effect by education. In
the US context, this type of bias is likely to be relatively small, since downgrading by education
is, in contrast to downgrading by experience, small.
National skill-cell approach: Downgrading also leads to a bias in the estimates obtained from the
national skill-cell approach. The direction of the bias is principally ambiguous, and depends on the
relative importance of the observed education-experience immigration shocks. In Figure 2, we plot
the bias factor from downgrading against the degree of downgrading by education, where 0 refers
to no downgrading and 0.5 refers to the case where 50% of high skilled immigrants actually work
in low skilled jobs. In the figure, we assume for simplicity that the degree of downgrading by
experience is the same for high and low skilled immigrants, and depict the bias factor for varying
degrees of downgrading by experience (no downgrading, 30% and 60% of downgrading). The
observed education-experience immigration shocks are computed from the 2000 US Census, based
on immigrants who entered the US in the past two years.5 The figure illustrates that over this time
5 In this time period, the observed education-experience specific immigration shock ∆ܫ௚௔ was at 0.0225 largest
for low skilled inexperienced natives (workers with 20 or less years of potential experience who did not attend college),
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period in the US, the bias factor exceeds one—implying an overstatement of the negative relative
wage effect—and, depending on the degrees of downgrading, can be very large. In the companion
appendix to the paper, we show that based on the 2000 US Census data, reasonable estimates for
the degree of downgrading by education and by experience are 0.09 and 0.54, respectively. Such
degrees of downgrading suggest a bias factor of more than 2—implying that the “true” relative
effect by experience, were we able to correctly assign immigrants to skill-cells, is less than half of
the estimated effect. Since in the US context downgrading by experience exceeds downgrading by
education, the bias from downgrading will be larger in the skill-cell than in the mixture approach.
Downgrading therefore provides an alternative explanation as to why the national skill-cell
approach typically produces more negative wages effects of immigration than the mixture
approach. Furthermore, as the degree of downgrading declines with time in the host country, any
bias from downgrading will be larger when annual rather than decadal Census data are used for
estimation.
Structural Models and Substitutability between Immigrants and Natives
A more structural approach is to estimate the underlying parameters of the canonical model
above and to use that model to predict the wage effects of immigration. Using this approach,
resulting estimates obviously rely on strong structural assumptions which are far more stringent
than those imposed by the empirical literature discussed so far. Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1997)
offer an early application of this approach. More recently, Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) extend this approach to more flexible production
and at 0.0026 smallest for high skilled experienced natives. High skilled inexperienced natives experienced a
somewhat larger immigration shock than low skilled experienced natives (∆ܫுூ= 0.0113 and ∆ܫ௅ா = 0.0073).
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functions, but maintain the assumption of inelastic labor supply. Llull (2013) and Piyapromdee
(2015) relax this assumption and model labor supply choices.
Here, we will focus on Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth
(2012). These two studies report positive wage effects of immigration for natives. For example,
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) predict the long-run total wage effect (assuming fully elastic capital) of
immigration on native workers to be 0.6% over the period 1990 to 2006 in the US. Scaled by its
impact on total labor supply (an increase of 11.4%), this estimates suggest that a one-percent
increase in labor supply by immigration increases the wage of native workers by 0.05% (see
bottom panel of Table 1). By contrast, previous immigrants suffer a substantial wage loss (-0.6%).
Both studies impose a production technology similar to the one described above, but allow
immigrants and natives to be imperfect substitutes within each education-experience cell. If
immigrants and natives are imperfect substitutes within education-experience groups, and mostly
low-skilled inexperienced immigrants enter the labor market, then the incumbent low-skilled
inexperienced immigrants will bear most of the burden of increased immigration—the more so the
less substitutable immigrants and natives are within skill-cells. In contrast, wages of not only high
skilled experienced natives, but also of low skilled inexperienced natives may increase in response
to immigration if immigrants and natives are not very substitutable within education-experience
groups. These arguments highlight that the crucial parameter underlying the predicted total wage
effects of immigration is the estimated elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives
within education-experience cells.
Both Ottaviano and Peri (2012) and Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012) estimate
the elasticity of substitution between immigrants and natives by relating the relative wage changes
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of immigrants and natives observed in a particular skill-cell to the respective relative employment
changes. The two studies report estimates of the elasticity of substitution of about 20 (Ottaviano
and Peri 2012) and 7 (Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth 2012). But these estimates may be
seriously impaired by the downgrading and thus misclassification of immigrants across skill-cells
(see Dustmann and Preston 2012 for a detailed discussion). This bias may increase further if wage
changes of immigrants between two time periods not only reflect wage changes of existing
immigrants in response to immigration, but also differences in wages between existing and
entering immigrants within education and experience groups (see Ruist 2013). If the estimates for
the degree of substitutability between immigrants and natives are biased, then this will cause the
estimates of the total and relative effects of immigration as predicted by the structure of the model
to be biased—even if the model is correctly specified. In principle, the direction of the bias in the
estimates for the elasticity of substitution between immigrant and natives is ambiguous. In the
companion appendix to this paper, we provide, focusing on the high-skilled experienced group and
observed immigration inflows in the US, an example in which downgrading leads to an
overestimate of the degree of substitutability between immigrants and natives, which will
understate wage losses for the low skilled inexperienced natives most exposed to immigration,
overstate possible wage gains for the high skilled experienced natives least exposed to
immigration, and overstate the wage losses of previous immigrants. Therefore, based on the
observed immigration shocks in the US context, downgrading is likely to lead to an overstatement
of the negative (relative) wage responses of natives in the mixture and in particular the skill-cell
approach, but an understatement of the (total) wage responses of natives in the structural approach.
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Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we revisit the question why different studies on the effects of immigration on
wages come to different conclusions, and why there is continued controversy in this debate. We
classify the existing empirical studies that estimate wage effects of immigration in three types:
studies that use variation in immigrant inflows across education-experience cells at the national
level, as for example in Borjas (2003), studies that exploit variation in the total immigrant inflow
across regions, as for example in Altonji and Card (1991), and studies that use variation in
immigrant flows both across regions and across educations groups, as for example in Card (2001).
We show that these three approaches identify different and not comparable parameters, which is
one important reason for the continued controversy of the wage effects of immigration in the
existing literature. While the national skill-cell approach identifies the effect of immigration on
one experience group versus another within education groups, the mixture approach identifies the
relative effect of immigration of one education group versus another. By contrast, the pure spatial
approach recovers the total effect of immigration which, unlike the first two approaches, takes into
account complementarities across skill-cells and across capital and labor.
We then relax the maintained assumption in much of the existing literature that native labor
supply is either inelastic, or equally elastic across different skill groups. We show that in the
presence of labor response heterogeneity, estimated relative wage effects of immigration from the
national skill-cell approach yield misleading and hard to interpret estimates of the overall labor
market impact of immigration. In contrast, estimates of total effects of immigration retain a clear
interpretation, and remain meaningful and policy-relevant. Employment and wage effects,
however, need to be studied jointly to obtain an accurate picture of the overall labor market effect
of immigration.
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We finally discuss the possibility that immigrants “downgrade” and work in jobs below
their observed education and experience level, and argue that downgrading will lead to biased
estimates in the national skill-cell and mixture approach that rely on variation of immigration
inflows across skill-cells. Although the bias from downgrading cannot be generally signed, we
illustrate that in the US context it may severely overstate the negative relative wage effect by
experience in the national skill-cell approach. Downgrading is also likely to overstate the negative
relative wage effect by education estimated by the mixture approach, but in the US context the
bias is likely to be smaller than in the national skill-cell approach—which may be one reason why
the mixture approach tends to produce less negative wage effects than the national skill-cell
approach. By contrast, the total effect of immigration identified by the pure spatial approach is
robust to downgrading, as there is no need to assign immigrants to skill-cells.
We further point out that downgrading poses a problem for structural approaches that allow
immigrants and natives to be imperfect substitutes within education-experience groups and
calculate relative and total effects of immigration based on estimated parameters and the structure
of the model, as for example in Ottaviano and Perio (2012) and Manacorda, Manning and
Wadsworth (2012). Specifically, we show that in the presence of downgrading, immigrants and
natives may appear to be imperfect substitutes within skill-cells even though they are not. This
will lead to understating the wage losses of native workers, even if the model is correctly
specified—which may help to explain why the structural approach typically produces positive
(total) wage effects of immigration for natives.
In sum, we advocate exploiting variation in the overall immigration shock for the
identification of the total labor market effects of immigration. Not only does this approach identify
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a meaningful and policy relevant parameter, but it is also robust to heterogeneous labor supply
elasticities across skill groups and the downgrading of immigrants.
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Skill-Cell	Approach Country Sample Specification Group Coefficient Std.	Error
Borjas	(2003) US Census	and	CPS,	1960-2001 OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.57 (0.16)
Aydemir	and	Borjas	(2007) Canada	 Census,	1971-2001 OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.51 (0.20)
US Census,	1960-2000 OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.49 (0.22)
Llull	(2014) Canada,	US Census,	1960-2000 IV,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -1.66 (0.66)
Borjas	(2014) US Census	and	ACS,	1960-2011 OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.53 (0.10)
Card	and	Peri	(2016) US Census	and	ACS,	1960-2011 OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.12 (0.13)
Spatial	Approach Country Sample Specification Group Coefficient Std.	Error
Card	(1990) US Census	and	CPS,	1979-1985,	4	MSAs OLS,	3-year	difference natives,	whitea -0.14 -
Altonji	and	Card	(1991) US Census,	1970-1980,	120	MSAs IV,	weighted,	decadal natives -1.21 (0.34)
natives,	white	dropouts -1.10 (0.64)
Dustmann,	Fabbri	and	Preston	(2005) UK LFS,	1992-2000,	17	regions IV,	weighted,	yearly natives 	0.91 (0.58)
Card	(2007) US Census,	1980-2000,	100	MSAs IV,	weighted,	cross-section natives 	0.06 (0.01)
Boustan,	Fishback	and	Kantor	(2010) US Census,	1940,	69		MSAs IV,	weighted,	cross-section men 	0.01 (0.54)
Dustmann,	Frattini	and	Preston	(2013) UK Census	and	LFS,	1997-2005,	17	regions IV,	yearly natives 	0.40 (0.11)
natives,	10th	pct.b -0.52 (0.18)
natives,	90th	pct.b 	0.41 (0.19)
Borjas	(2015) US Census	and	CPS,	1977-1992,	44	MSAs OLS,	weighted,	3-year	difference natives,	dropoutsc -2.63 (1.08)
Dustmann,	Schönberg		and	Stuhler	(2015) Germany IAB,	1986-1996,	1,550	municipalities IV,	weighted,	3-year	difference natives -0.13 (0.05)
natives,	young,	low	education -0.56 (0.11)
Peri	and	Yasenov	(2016) US Census	and	CPS,	1977-1992,	44	MSAs OLS,	weighted,	3-year	difference natives,	dropoutsd 1.11 (0.55)
Foged	and	Peri	(2016) Denmark IDA,	1995-2008,	97	municipalities IV,	weighted,	yearly natives,	low	education 	1.80 (0.64)
Mixed	Approach Country Sample Specification Group Coefficient Std.	Error
LaLonde	and	Topel	(1991) US Census,	1970	and	1980,	MSA	x	arrival	cohort OLS,	weighted,	decadal immigrants,	recent	(≤5	yrs.)	arrivals -0.09 (0.03)
Card	(2001) US Census,	1990,	MSA	x	occupation IV,	weighted,	cross-section natives,	men -0.10 (0.03)
Borjas	(2006) US Census,	1960-2000,	MSA	x	education	x	experience OLS,	weighted,	decadal natives -0.06 (0.02)
Card	and	Lewis	(2007) US Census,	1980-2000,	MSA	x	education IV,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.04 (0.06)
Card	(2009) US Census	and	ACS,	1980-2006,	MSA	x	education IV,	weighted,	decadal natives,	men -0.42 (0.28)
Lewis	(2011) US Census,	1980-2000,	MSA	x	education IV,	weighted,	decadal natives,	manufacturing -0.14 (0.04)
Glitz	(2012) Germany IAB	Subsample,	1996-2001,	region	x	education IV,	weighted,	yearly natives -0.26 (0.19)
Dustmann	and	Glitz	(2015) Germany IAB	Subsample,	1985-1995,	region	education IV,	weighted,	decadal natives,	manufacturing -0.10 (0.06)
Özden	and	Wagner	(2015) Malaysia LFS,	2000-2010,	region	x	industry IV,	weighted,	yearly natives 	0.02 (0.01)
Structural	Approach Country Sample Group	and	Specificatione Elasticities	of	Substitutionf
Ottaviano	and	Peri	(2012) US Census	and	ACS,	1960-2006 natives,	long	run !(X)=6.25,	!(E)=3.3,	!(MN)≈20
immigrants,	long	run
Manacorda,	Manning	and	Wadsworth	(2012) UK LFS	and	GHS,	1975-2005 natives,	low	education,	long	run !(X)=5.2,	!(E)=4.9,	!(MN)≈6.9
natives,	high	education,	long	run
0.20
Note:	The	table	reports	coefficient	estimates	from	a	regression	of	(changes	in)	log	wages	or	earnings	for	the	indicated	group	on	a	measure	of	the	immigrant	supply	shock	(e.g.	change	in	immigrant	share	or	inflow	rate).	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	
Estimates	are	not	directly	comparable	as	sample,	specification,	conditioning	variables	and	definitions	of	the	supply	shock	differ	across	studies.	Only	main	data	sources	listed	(ACS=American	Community	Survey,	CPS=Current	Population	Survey,	GHI=General	
Household	Survey,	IAB=Institute	for	Employment	Research,	IDA=Danish	Integrated	Database	for	Labor	Market	Research,	LFS=Labor	Force	Survey).	A	specification	is	classified	as	weighted	if	estimation	is	on	the	individual	level	or	if	regression	weights	are	used	
on	aggregate	statistics.	a1979	vs.	1982	difference-in-differences	estimate,	scaled	by	the	immigration-induced	7%	increase	in	labor	force.	bnatives	at	the	indicated	percentile	of	the	native	wage	distribution.	c1977-1979	vs.	1981-1983	synthetic	control	
estimate,	scaled	by	immigration-induced	8%	increase	in	labor	force.	d1979	vs.	1980-1982	synthetic	control	estimate,	scaled	by	the		immigration-induced	8%	increase	in	labor	force.	eCapital	is	assumed	inelastic	in	short	run	and	perfectly	elastic	in	long	run.	
fEstimated	elasticities	of	substitution	across	education	group	(!(X)),	experience	groups	(!(E)),	or	between	immigrants	and	natives	(!(MN)).	gSimulated	wage	impact	normalized	by	overall	migration	shock	over	period.
Simulated	Impactg
Table	1:	Selected	Studies	on	the	Wage	Impact	of	Immigration
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-0.60
Panel	D:	Upgrading	of	Immigrants	over	Time	(United	States)
Figure	1:	Downgrading	of	Immigrants
Panel	A:	United	States Panel	B:	United	Kingdom
Panel	C:	Germany
Note:	Panels	A-C	show	kernel	estimates	of	the	actual	(dashed	lines)	and	predicted	(solid	lines)	density	of	immigrants	in	the	native	wage	distribution.	Panel	D	shows	
the	difference	between	the	actual	and	predicted	density	of	immigrants.	The	horizontal	line	shows	as	a	reference	the	native	wage	distribution.	The	kernel	estimates	
are	above	the	horizontal	line	at	wages	where	immigrants	are	more	concentrated	than	natives,	and	below	the	horizontal	line	at	wages	where	immigrants	are	less	
concentrated	than	natives.	Source:	US	Census	2000,	UK	Labor	Force	Survey	1995-2005,	and	IAB	Employment	Subsample	2000.
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Percentile of non−immigrant wage distribution
Arrival <=2 years Arrival 3−10 years Arrival >10 years
Actual vs. Predicted Position of Foreign workers
(a)	United	States	(Census,	year	2000)
Observed Effective
Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total
				low			 44.1% 13.4% 57.6% 				low			 56.2% 4.0% 60.3%
				high			 36.3% 6.2% 42.5% 				high			 34.1% 5.6% 39.7%
			total			 80.4% 19.6% 			total			 90.3% 9.7%
(a)	United	Kingdom	(UK	LFS,	years	2003-2005)
Observed Effective
Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total
				low			 24.1% 6.2% 30.3% 				low			 71.3% 4.1% 75.4%
				high			 62.7% 7.0% 69.7% 				high			 21.7% 2.9% 24.6%
			total			 86.8% 13.2% 			total			 93.0% 7.0%
(a)	Germany	(IABS,	year	2000)
Observed Effective
Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total Education				1-20	yrs 21-40	yrs total
				low			 36.3% 6.2% 42.5% 				low			 61.9% 0.0% 61.9%
				high			 51.4% 6.1% 57.5% 				high			 35.8% 2.3% 38.1%
			total			 87.7% 12.3% 			total			 97.7% 2.3%
Note:	The	table	reports	the	observed	and	imputed	effective	skills	of	immigrants	who	arrived	within	
the	last	two	years.	The	imputation	of	effective	skills	is	based	on	the	distribution	of	workers	across	
wage	centiles	and	2-digit	occupations,	as	described	in	Appendix	A.	Source:	US	Census	2000,	UK	LFS	
2003-2005,	and	IABS	2000.
Potential	ExperiencePotential	Experience
Table	2:	The	Observed	and	Effective	Skills	of	Immigrant	Arrivals
Potential	Experience Potential	Experience
Potential	Experience Potential	Experience
Note: 	The	figure	illustrates	the	bias	which	may	arise	in	estimates	of	the	relative	wage	effect	by	
experience	of	immigration	obtained	by	the	national	skill	cell	approach	when	immigrants	
downgrade.	The	figure	plots	the	bias	factor	against	the	degree	of	downgrading	by	education,	for	
three	degrees	of	downgrading	by	experience	(0,	0.3	and	0.6).	For	example,	a	bias	factor	of	2	
implies	that	the	estimated	effect	based	on	the	observed	skill-specific	immigration	shock	is	twice	
as	large	as	the	true	effect	that	we	would	obtain	if	we	could	correctly	assign	immigrants	to	skill	
cells.	The	observed	shocks	to	each	education	and	experience	group	drawn	from	the	2000	US	
Census.	See	Appendix	D	for	details.
Figure	2:		Illustration	of	the	Bias	in	the	National	Skill	Cell	Approach	when	Immigrants	
Downgrade
